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[Penultimate version; forthcoming in Review of Philosophy and Psychology] 
 
Abstract: Suppose you’re imagining that it’s raining hard. You then proceed to imagine, 
as part of the same imaginative project, that you believe that it isn’t raining. Such an 
imaginative project is possible if the two imaginings arise in succession. But what about 
simultaneously imagining that it’s raining and that you believe that it isn’t raining? I will 
argue that, under certain conditions, such an imagining is impossible. After discussing 
these conditions, I will suggest an explanation of this impossibility. Elaborating on the 
view outlined in Walton (1990), I will argue that the impossibility follows from the fact 
that imaginings ‘mimic’ beliefs in aiming at the fictionally true, just as beliefs aim at the 
true. 
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The term ‘imagining’ and its cognates can denote several different kinds of mental states, 
e.g., false beliefs, mental imagery, mere thoughts, etc. (see, e.g., Kind 2013; 2016, 2ff; 
Van Leeuwen 2013). In this paper, ‘imagining’ denotes belief-like imagining.1 Belief-like 
imaginings are representational states with propositional content; they may arise in 
pretending, playing games of make-believe, daydreaming, mindreading, modal reasoning, 
responding to reading or watching fiction, and so on. They may also arise, spontaneously 
or intentionally, without any connection to these settings. It is widely accepted that such 
imaginings are functionally similar to beliefs: they are related to other kinds of mental 
states—conative states, emotional responses, motivations—in a manner akin to that in 
which beliefs are related to those states or similar ones.2 It is also widely accepted that 
belief-like imaginings mirror the inferential patterns of beliefs, i.e., that the same 
inferential mechanism that governs beliefs also applies to imaginings.3 The differences 
 
1 Although belief-like imaginings are sometimes called ‘propositional’ or ‘attitudinal’ 
imaginings, using these terms here could be misleading, since desire-like imaginings and 
sensory (perception-like) imaginings can also be deemed propositional or attitudinal; see 
Kind (2013, 154-155); (2016, 5-6). 
2 See, e.g., Arcangeli (2019b), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), Doggett and Egan (2007; 
2012), Gendler (2003), Ichino (2019), Kind (2013), Langland-Hassan (2012), Liao and 
Doggett (2014), Liao and Gendler (2020), Nichols (2004; 2006), Nichols and Stich 
(2003), Van Leeuwen (2011; 2013), Walton (1990; 2015). 
3 See, e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), 12ff; Nichols (2006), §3.5; Weinberg and 
Meskin (2006), 180-181; Van Leeuwen (2013); Stock (2017), §6.2. Another, less 
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between belief-like imaginings and beliefs ensue from the fact that whereas beliefs aim at 
truth simpliciter, and hence are responsive to evidence, consistent with other beliefs about 
the real world, etc., imaginings do not: imaginings do not respond to evidence, need not 
be consistent with beliefs about the real world, etc. (Kind 2016, 3ff). 
The fact that imaginings do not aim at truth does not mean that they are totally 
unconstrained. For instance, although we can consider, assume, hypothesize, entertain in 
thought, etc., an overt logical contradiction (e.g., ‘p and not-p’), most philosophers deny 
that we can imagine such a contradiction.4 Similarly, on certain views, it is impossible to 
 
discussed, similarity between imaginings and beliefs is that imaginings ‘aim’ at the 
fictional just as beliefs aim at the true (Walton 1990; see §4 below). 
4 That we cannot imagine an overt contradiction is usually accepted not only by those 
who take imagining to have an ‘imagistic’ or sensory component, but also by those who 
deny this; see Kind (2013, 151). Note too that I did not list the attitude of supposing, 
which on certain views (e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; cf. Balcerak Jackson 2016; 
Arcangeli 2019a) is regarded as (a type of) belief-like imagining. For if supposing is (a 
type of) belief-like imagining, the scope of belief-like imagining to which the puzzle in 
question applies should be narrowed, since without further qualification, we can suppose 
an overt logical contradiction (e.g., in reductio ad absurdum), and a fortiori, we can 
suppose content such as Moorean conjunctions. To be compatible with these views, my 
argument should be taken to apply only to imaginings that are constrained in certain 
ways, ways that render them subject to the puzzle (see my explanation below). 
Accordingly, my solution to the puzzle should be seen as revealing the specific 
constraints that render imagining subject to the puzzle. 
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imagine, as per the puzzle of imaginative resistance, morally-deviant propositions (Tuna 
2020). There may also be specific constraints on imagining; e.g., if one is engaged in an 
imaginative project5 in which the next-door neighbor is taken to be a dragon, one is 
‘committed’ to responding to any sighting of that neighbor by imagining that there is a 
dragon there. However, despite such constraints and others, there is a significant 
difference between beliefs and belief-like imaginings: beliefs track truth simpliciter, 
whereas imaginings do not. 
Belief-like imaginings differ from the sensory or ‘imagistic’ imaginings that 
sometimes, perhaps always, accompany them.6 Sensory imaginings are not belief-like, 
but rather are akin to perceptual experiences. I do not deny that sensory imaginings play a 
role in imaginative projects, but my argument applies to belief-like imaginings. My 
argument is also compatible with views on which states such as imagining experiencing 
(e.g., imagining seeing a tree), imagining doing something (e.g., imagining playing the 
 
5 I will take an imaginative project to be the overall mental activity associated with 
imagining. More precisely, an imaginative project encompasses implicit and explicit 
imaginings, stipulations regarding the fictional world at which one’s imaginings are 
directed, patterns of inference that apply to one’s imaginings, various kinds of mental 
states that are functionally related to one’s imaginings (i.e., emotional responses, conative 
states, mental imagery, etc.), and so on. 
6 Some philosophers, e.g., Kind (2001), argue that imaginings must have an imagistic 
component; others (Walton 1990, 13; Van Leeuwen 2013, 222) disagree. My argument is 
neutral with respect to this debate. See also Arcangeli (2019b) for a recent discussion of 
the relation between mental images and sensory imagination. 
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piano), and imagining being part of a certain scenario (e.g., imagining being on a 
battlefield) encompass more than just belief-like imaginings; the argument, however, 
focuses on belief-like imagining. In general, to achieve compatibility with the various 
accounts of belief-like imagining proposed in the literature, the minimum I will assume is 
that there is a kind of imagining, or a kind of imagining that is constrained in certain 
ways (see note 4), to which the following puzzle applies.7 Accordingly, my explanation 
of the puzzle will seek to reveal the specific features of this kind of imagining, or the 
specific constraints that render imagining subject to the puzzle. For convenience, I will 
describe the impossibility in question as an impossibility that applies to belief-like 
imagining in general. 
The first step in explaining the puzzle will be to distinguish two ways in which one 
can imagine beliefs. These two ways of imagining beliefs are similar to the two ways in 
which we can have beliefs about beliefs. 
 
 
7 Defending a view on which belief-like imaginings are relatively unconstrained, Stock 
(2017) argues that “one can propositionally imagine that anything is the case, at least as 
long as one also imagines that there is some (good) explanation for it” (141). On Stock’s 
view, my account should be interpreted as an explanation of why it is impossible to 
imagine a Moorean conjunction by virtue of imagining a good explanation for it. Since 
my starting point is the tension between imagining p and imagining that one believes that 
not-p, the explanation for this tension can be framed in terms of different views of belief-
like imagination, and specifically, views that impose minimal constraints on the scope of 
imaginative content. 
6 
2. Imagining Beliefs 
 
Beliefs can be thought of, and ascribed to a subject, in two different ways: from the third-
person perspective or from the first-person perspective. The former involves ascribing a 
belief to a subject by invoking evidence regarding that subject’s behavior (including 
facial expressions). For instance, upon perceiving, or having testimonial or other 
evidence that the subject is closing windows, saying ‘it’s pouring,’ taking an umbrella 
from the umbrella stand, etc., we might ascribe to her the belief that it’s raining.8 We can 
also invoke this third-person evidential mode of belief-ascription in ascribing beliefs to 
ourselves. That is, evidence regarding our own conduct can also serve as evidence for the 
belief that we believe a certain proposition. 
The second mode of belief-ascription pertains to self-ascription of beliefs. Though 
we sometimes self-ascribe a belief in the third-person manner just described (i.e., on the 
basis of behavioral evidence), self-ascription of beliefs is ordinarily carried out from the 
first-person perspective often associated with the notion of ‘introspection.’ In this paper, I 
will try to remain neutral regarding the question of whether self-ascription of beliefs is 
based on one’s ‘inner sense’ (e.g., Lycan 1996) or on ‘looking outward’ for assurance 
that the content of the putative belief is true (Byrne 2005). Whether or not we have ‘inner 
access,’ or some other sort of privileged or unique access to our mental states, I will 
 
8 This description of third-person belief-ascription is largely theory-neutral. Specifically, 
it is compatible with both ‘theory-theory’ and simulation accounts of mindreading, since 
on both sorts of accounts, ascribing a belief from the third-person perspective is based on 
behavioral evidence. See Barlassina and Gordon (2017). 
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assume that we usually ascribe beliefs to ourselves in a manner that differs from that in 
which we ascribe beliefs to others. Specifically, I will assume that there is a way to self-
ascribe beliefs without invoking behavioral evidence. 
These two ways in which we ascribe beliefs reflect two ways in which we ordinarily 
think about beliefs. On the one hand, beliefs, being associated with certain behaviors, can 
be thought of as manifested in those behaviors. On the other, we can think of beliefs 
under a ‘first-person’ mode of presentation, namely, the mode of presentation under 
which they manifest themselves to the subject from the first-person perspective. This 
mode of presentation would presumably be unpacked differently by the different 
approaches to introspection. On inner-sense theories, there must be a specific mode of 
presentation under which a belief manifests itself to the subject’s inner sense; hence, we 
can think of a belief, on these theories, under that mode. On ‘looking-outward’ theories 
(Byrne 2005), the first-person mode of presentation amounts to a belief’s being 
‘transparent’: the belief manifests itself in the subject’s being in a position to reply, upon 
being asked whether she believes, e.g., that it’s raining, by looking outward at the world, 
and seeing whether it is indeed raining. However we unpack the mode of presentation 
under which beliefs manifest themselves from the first-person perspective, my argument 
will focus on this mode. 
The two ways in which real-world beliefs are ascribed to a subject, and, likewise, 
manifest themselves to us, also apply to imagined beliefs. On the one hand, we can 
imagine that a subject believes that it’s raining by imagining her acting in ways 
associated with the belief that it’s raining: we can imagine her closing windows, saying 
‘it’s raining,’ etc., and thus imagine that she believes that it’s raining. We can also 
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imagine ourselves having beliefs in this same manner, i.e., by imagining ourselves acting 
in the said ways. On the other hand, we can imagine ourselves having a belief from the 
first-person perspective, namely, without imagining ourselves acting in any particular 
way. Different theories of belief self-ascription would presumably give different accounts 
of how we imagine beliefs presented under the first-person mode. Inner-sense theories 
would argue that to imagine a belief under the first-person mode of presentation is to 
imagine the belief as it manifests itself to the subject’s ‘inner sense,’ whereas ‘looking-
outward’ theories would argue that to imagine a ‘first-person’ belief is to imagine the 
belief as being ‘transparent.’ Whichever theory is correct, we can imagine ourselves 
having beliefs under the first-person mode of presentation, just as we can believe that we 
have beliefs under the first-person mode of presentation. 
 
3. The Puzzle 
 
The puzzle rests on the impossibility of imagining (in the belief-like sense) the 
conjunction ‘p and I believe that not-p’ (‘p and I believe that not-p’ is known as the 
‘commissive form’ of Moore’s paradox; my argument also applies to the ‘omissive’ 
form, i.e., ‘p and I do not believe that p.’ For convenience, I will generally refer to the 
commissive form). This impossibility arises when four main conditions are fulfilled. The 
first condition is that the belief referred to in the second conjunct, i.e., ‘I believe that not-
p,’ is imagined under the first-person mode of presentation. Regardless of which account 
of first-person belief-manifestation is endorsed, the impossibility arises only if we try to 
imagine that we believe that not-p under this mode of presentation. This condition is 
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necessary, since it is possible to imagine the belief that not-p by imagining ourselves, 
e.g., acting in ways associated with the belief that not-p, while also imagining that p. 
Compare: it is possible to believe that it’s raining, while also believing, since we find 
ourselves acting in ways associated with the belief that it isn’t raining, that we believe 
that it isn’t raining. 
Secondly, the impossibility in question arises, at least in many cases, only if the two 
conjuncts are imagined simultaneously. For under certain circumstances, it may not be 
problematic to imagine, e.g., that it’s raining, and that one (first-person) believes that it 
isn’t raining, if the two imaginings arise in succession. In fact, under certain 
circumstances, there is nothing problematic about imagining even overtly contradictory 
propositions successively. For instance, in reading a novel and imagining its content, we 
can imagine, as per the novel’s implicit guidance, that person A is the villain, and 
subsequently, imagine that person B is the villain, not A. Such a shift from imagining one 
proposition to imagining a contradictory proposition may occur not only in reading 
fiction, but also in, e.g., daydreams and spontaneous imaginative projects with the said 
content. In such cases, imagining overtly contradictory propositions may nonetheless be 
impossible if the subject tries to imagine the contradictory propositions simultaneously. 
Now if imagining explicitly contradictory propositions successively is possible, then, 
a fortiori, imagining that it’s raining and subsequently imagining that one believes that it 
isn’t raining, which (without further qualification) is not explicitly contradictory, is 
possible. For instance, we can imagine that it’s raining, and subsequently imagine that, 
upon introspection, we discover that we believe that it isn’t raining. In such a case, the 
imaginative project ‘evolves’ in a way that allows us to imagine the two conjuncts. 
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Moreover, given such ‘evolving’ imaginings, we are likely to wind up imagining that we 
‘revise’ the belief we discovered via introspection following our first imagining (i.e., the 
imagining that it’s raining); conceivably, we could also wind up imagining that it isn’t 
raining, as per the belief we imagined uncovering by introspection. In such cases, what I 
claim to nonetheless be impossible is to imagine that it’s raining and that at the same time 
we (first-person) believe that it isn’t raining. Note that the simultaneity condition need 
not apply in every case: in certain cases—specifically, where no ‘belief revision’ is 
imagined—the ‘tension’ between imagining the two conjuncts obtains even if the two 
conjuncts are imagined successively. To ensure that the impossibility in question ensues 
generally, I will simply assume that the two conjuncts are imagined simultaneously. 
Note also that in addition to the condition that the imaginings arise simultaneously, 
the imagined events must be imagined as occurring simultaneously, and moreover: in the 
present. For it can easily be imagined that, e.g., it was raining, and I believed that it 
wasn’t. (Compare: a subject can readily believe ‘it was raining, and I believed that it 
wasn’t raining.’). Similarly, a subject can imagine ‘it will be raining tomorrow, and I will 
believe that it is not raining.’ In short, the present-tense verbs in the imagined 
propositions are crucial, since the impossibility in question arises only if one tries to 
imagine the two events—i.e., that it is raining and that one believes that it isn’t—as 
occurring in the present. Ordinarily, imagining different events as occurring in the present 
does not raise any particular problem. You can easily imagine, e.g., that you’re lying on 
the sofa and that it’s raining; that you’re hungry and it’s raining; that it’s raining and you 
believe that it’s indeed raining; etc. What you cannot represent in belief-like imagining 
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(under the specified conditions) is that it’s raining, and that you believe that it isn’t 
raining. 
Thirdly, the impossibility ensues only if, in imagining the two conjuncts, the 
imagining is ‘directed’ at the same fictional world. For we can imagine, simultaneously, 
that it’s raining in one fictional world, and that we (first-person) believe that it isn’t 
raining in a different fictional world. The notion of a fictional world is usually associated 
with the ‘world’ of a work of fiction, but also applicable to other sorts of imaginative 
projects (see Walton 1990; 2015, ch. 2): we refer to the ‘world’ of a game of make-
believe (e.g., in the aforementioned example, the world in which it is true that the next-
door neighbor is a dragon), the ‘world’ of a daydream, etc. Even when imaginings arise 
spontaneously, we can, upon reflection, recognize the ‘truths’ of the world of our 
imaginative project, and the respects in which that world remained indeterminate. 
Note that my account does not presuppose any specific theory of fictional worlds. 
For convenience, I will use Walton’s characterization, taking a fictional world to be a “set 
of propositions” (1990, 66-67).9 That is, I will identify a fictional world with the set of 
 
9 More precisely, Walton characterizes fictional worlds as “sets of propositions-as-
indicated-by-a-given-work” (1990, 67). Two fictional worlds may thus be composed of 
the same set of propositions, yet differ because they are set forth in different works. Since 
Walton takes fictional worlds to be stipulated not only when engaging with fiction, but 
also in playing games of make-believe, daydreaming, etc. (Walton 1990, pp. 44-45), this 
characterization also applies to imaginative projects more generally: a fictional world is 
the set of propositions stipulated to be true in a given imaginative project. That is, a 
fictional world is associated with the mental activity—the imaginative project—in the 
 
12 
propositions stipulated to be true in a given imaginative project.10 The relation between 
imaginings and stipulating fictional worlds will be further explained in §4. The point I’m 
making here is that it is impossible to imagine the conjunction only if our imagining is 
‘directed’ at a single fictional world, that is, only if the two conjuncts are putatively 
assessed for truth in the same fictional world. 
The fourth condition is that the imaginer must be sufficiently rational. This condition 
can be shown to be necessary by comparing the impossibility in question to Moorean 
impossibility. Famously, it is impossible for rational subjects to believe the conjunction 
‘p and that I believe that not-p.’ Although Moore’s paradox applies primarily to 
assertions (i.e., it is impossible for a rational agent to assert ‘p and I believe that not-p’), 
the paradox also applies to the mental states that ground assertions, namely, beliefs. The 
point is that if a subject is irrational and can believe ‘p and I believe that not-p,’ she can 
obviously also imagine this conjunction. A similar condition applies to the impossibility 
of imagining a contradiction. Although overt contradictions can hardly be imagined 
(Kind 2013, 151), if the imaginer is irrational to the effect that she can believe a 
contradiction, she can also imagine that contradiction. Much as the impossibility of 
imagining a contradiction ensues only if the imagining subject is sufficiently rational, the 
 
context of which it is set up. Hence it is also individuated by the relations between 
imaginings and other kinds of mental states that are part of the imaginative project 
(emotional responses, conative states, mental imagery, etc.). 
10 On this characterization, fictional worlds almost never overlap the real world, since 
they usually include propositions that are false simpliciter. Furthermore, unlike the real 
world, fictional worlds are usually highly indeterminate. 
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impossibility of imagining ‘p and I believe that not-p’ ensues only if the imaginer is 
sufficiently rational. (In §4, I explain the specific aspect that renders the imagining of 
Moorean conjunctions impossible). 
Let me show how the impossibility ensues in a case where all the four conditions are 
clearly fulfilled. Consider an example adduced in Walton (1990, 37ff). Greg and Eric 
play a game of make-believe in which they take tree-stumps in the forest they’re hiking 
through to be bears. The ‘fictional world’ of their game includes, among other 
propositions, propositions of the form ‘there is a bear at spot x’—a spot where there is a 
(real-world) stump. Suppose that Greg imagines, as per his belief that there is a stump in 
the bushes behind him, that there is a bear in the bushes. Greg then decides to imagine, in 
addition, that he believes that there isn’t a bear in the bushes, despite his real-world 
knowledge that there is a stump, and hence a fictional bear, at that spot. Let us take it for 
granted that Greg is rational, and thus cannot believe Moorean conjunctions (i.e., the 
fourth of the aforementioned conditions is met). Greg can fulfill his plan in three different 
ways (or combinations thereof). 
First, Greg can simply stop imagining that there is a bear in the bushes, and proceed 
to imagine that he believes that there isn’t a bear there. For imagining even overtly 
contradictory propositions in succession does not always pose a problem. (Note that 
shifting from one imagining to another at will does not, or not always, pose a problem, 
since imaginings, unlike beliefs, are uncommitted to truth, unconstrained by evidence, 
etc.). And of course, Greg can imagine a slightly-revised conjunction in which the verbs 
in the imagined propositions are not present-tense verbs: he can imagine, e.g., that there 
was a bear in the bushes, and he believed that there wasn’t a bear there. Just like in 
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Moore’s puzzle, the impossibility does not arise if the events are not represented as 
occurring in the present. 
Second, suppose that Greg wants to imagine, simultaneously, both ‘there is a bear in 
the bushes,’ and ‘I believe that there isn’t a bear in the bushes.’ Greg can achieve this by 
temporarily directing the second conjunct at a different fictional world. That is, he can 
imagine the two scenarios—that there is a bear there, and that he believes that there isn’t 
a bear there—as occurring in two different fictional worlds. In imagining that he believes 
that there is no bear there, Greg temporarily ‘detaches’ himself from the game’s set-up, 
from what is taken to be true in its world, enabling him to imagine that belief. 
Lastly, if Greg wants to imagine the conjunction while taking the conjuncts to be 
assessed for truth in the same fictional world—the world of the stumps-are-bears game—
he can imagine that there is a bear in the bushes, and (simultaneously) that he believes 
that there isn’t a bear there, by imagining himself acting in ways associated with the 
belief that there isn’t a bear there. Greg can even observe the stump and imagine a bear, 
but nonetheless act, as per his plan, like someone who believes that there are no bears 
around, that no bears have been sighted there, etc.; by virtue of these acts, he can 
simultaneously imagine that there’s a bear in the bushes, and that he believes that there 
isn’t a bear there. As explained in §2, since it is possible to imagine oneself having a 
belief from the third-person perspective (i.e., by imagining one’s actions), one can readily 
imagine that one believes, from the third-person perspective, that there isn’t a bear in the 
bushes, while also imagining that there is a bear there. 
In sum, given that Greg is rational, what Greg cannot do is imagine, simultaneously, 
both that there is a bear in the bushes, and that, in the same world (i.e., the game’s 
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fictional world), he believes, from the first-person perspective, that there isn’t a bear 
there. 
At first sight, it seems that imaginings parallel beliefs in this respect, as per Moore’s 
paradox. Note that the said conditions apply to Moore’s paradox too. In Moore’s paradox, 
if the subject self-ascribes the belief that it isn’t raining from the third-person perspective 
(i.e., by invoking behavioral evidence), believing the conjunction doesn’t pose a problem 
even for rational subjects (Green and Williams 2007, 4ff; Fernández 2013, 123-124). For 
example, believing that she has her car keys, a subject may act in ways associated with 
the belief that she doesn’t have her keys, and thus ascribe to herself, by virtue of that 
behavioral evidence, the belief that she doesn’t have the keys, while still believing that 
she has them. Moreover, Moorean impossibility arises only if the rational subject tries to 
believe the two conjuncts simultaneously, and the conjuncts are formulated in the present 
tense. For she can obviously believe such a conjunction if the two conjuncts are 
formulated in the past- or future-tense, so as to express that she had, or will have, a false 
belief (see, e.g., Hintikka 1962, 65; Green and Williams 2007, 4). And furthermore, since 
Moore’s puzzle applies to beliefs, the conjuncts are taken to be assessed for truth in the 
same world, i.e., the real world. 
What is puzzling about instances of Moore’s paradox is that although the 
conjunction is not contradictory, and could even be true, it cannot be believed (see, e.g., 
Adler and Armour-Garb, 2007; Fernández 2013, §4). Moore’s paradox has been 
accounted for in different ways. On one approach, an explanation of the paradox must 
show that to believe a Moorean conjunction is to be logically inconsistent. Since 
Moorean conjunctions themselves are not contradictory, the inconsistency is 
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demonstrated by adding further premises. Specifically, in line with Hintikka’s pioneering 
work on doxastic logic, and his claim that believing the Moorean conjunction is 
“indefensible” (1962, 67ff), it is argued that the irrationality of believing the 
conjunction—or, similarly, the impossibility of rationally believing the conjunction—
follows from certain axioms of rationality. Those who adopt this approach maintain that, 
modulo these axioms, believing ‘p and I believe that not-p’ is impossible.11 A different 
approach to Moore’s paradox eschews the invocation of axioms of doxastic logic. As 
Green and Williams (2007) point out, “if possible, an account of Moorean absurdity 
should not appeal to controversial principles of epistemic or doxastic logic” (11).12 That 
 
11 More specifically, taking ‘Bp’ to denote one’s first-person belief that p, the idea is that, 
modulo the axioms of doxastic logic, B(p & B(not-p)), as well as B(p & not-Bp), are 
inconsistent. Regarding the omissive form, given that belief distributes over conjunction, 
B(p & not-Bp) entails Bp and B(not-Bp). On the axiom according to which Bp entails 
B(Bp) (commonly referred to as axiom 4), this yields B(Bp) and B(not-Bp), which 
violates another axiom of doxastic logic (axiom D), according to which a contradiction 
cannot be believed. The inconsistency of the commissive form is derived from another 
axiom (4c), according to which B(B(not-p)) entails B(not-p), which is inconsistent with 
the first conjunct, i.e., Bp; see, e.g., Rieger (2015, 217-218). Other logical analyses of the 
paradox have been suggested by Rieger (2015, 218ff), Van Benthem (2004), and others 
(Van Benthem discusses the paradox in the context of the paradox of the knower, 
analyzing it in terms of dynamic logic). 
12 The claim that Moore’s paradox does not involve a contradiction is occasionally made 
by those who generally do analyze epistemic paradoxes in terms of doxastic logic. E.g., 
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is, although the Moorean absurdity arises from a failure of (theoretical or practical) 
rationality, invoking axioms that presumably apply to an ideal rational agent would not 
explain the failure. For instance, Coliva (2015) argues that the paradox does not arise 
from any inconsistency in the agent’s beliefs: rather than analyzing the paradox in terms 
of inconsistencies between beliefs, Coliva analyzes it in terms of the impossibility of 
endorsing incompatible commitments, which would be “an impossible cognitive 
situation” (p. 189). 
In this paper, I do not endorse any specific approach to explaining Moore’s puzzle. 
For the puzzle addressed here is not Moore’s puzzle. Rather, the puzzle is that, although 
belief-like imaginings are not beliefs, it is nonetheless impossible to imagine (in the 
belief-like sense) Moorean conjunctions. That is, whatever the explanation of Moore’s 
puzzle, it presupposes a property of beliefs that is related to the fact that beliefs are truth-
committed. Imaginings, however, are not truth-committed, hence the puzzling aspect of 
Moore’s paradox does not apply to them. The puzzle raised by imaginings is that, despite 
not being committed to truth, they cannot have Moorean conjunctions as their content. 
 
Yalcin (2007) differentiates between doxastically-paradoxical conjunctions such as ‘it is 
raining and it might not be raining,’ and Moorean conjunctions, arguing that unlike those 
doxastically-paradoxical conjunctions, Moorean conjunctions are not contradictory, as 
their conjuncts do not “have incompatible truth-conditions” or “mutually entail each 
other’s falsity” (984). 
18 
To see that commitment to truth, or a certain property that follows from this 
commitment,13 is crucial to render beliefs subject to Moore’s puzzle, compare beliefs to 
mental states that are not committed to truth, e.g., assuming, considering, speculating, 
entertaining a thought, etc. It is clearly possible to take any of these attitudes toward the 
conjunction ‘it’s raining, and I (first-person) believe that it isn’t raining.’14 We can easily 
entertain this conjunction in thought or assume it in a variety of contexts. For instance, in 
philosophical discussions about introspection, or about the differences between first- and 
third-person belief-ascription, we can assume, consider, or hypothesize that ‘it’s raining 
and I (first-person) believe that it isn’t raining.’15 And obviously, when you read, and 
 
13 On the approach that analyzes Moore’s puzzle in terms of doxastic logic (see note 11), 
the property of being committed to truth does not straightforwardly explain why beliefs 
are subject to the puzzle. On this approach, the specific property of beliefs that renders 
them subject to the puzzle is described by axiom D (which indeed follows from the 
‘commitment to truth’ feature), on which a contradiction cannot be believed.   
14 Note that, since we can obviously consider (assume, etc.) a contradiction, a fortiori we 
can consider (assume etc.) the conjunction ‘p and I consider (assume, etc.) that not-p.’ In 
fact, we can also imagine ‘p and I imagine that not-p,’ but in this case, the possibility of 
imagining this conjunction ensues since the real-world imagining and the imagined 
imagining are directed at two different fictional worlds. 
15 That it is possible to consider (assume, hypothesize, etc.) Moorean conjunctions, but 
not to imagine them (in the sense discussed in this paper, and under the said conditions) 
is often implicit in various philosophical arguments. E.g., in discussing the ‘brains in a 
vat’ thought experiment, we can obviously consider the conjunction ‘I’m a brain in a vat, 
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understand, the proposition ‘it’s raining and I believe (from the first-person perspective) 
that it isn’t raining,’ you entertain this proposition in thought. Because entertaining such a 
conjunction in thought, assuming it, etc., do not involve a commitment to the 
conjunction’s truth, taking such attitudes toward Moorean conjunctions is not 
problematic. The problem arises only with regard to believing Moorean conjunctions, 
since belief is truth-committed. 
The puzzle in question arises from the fact that belief-like imaginings are like these 
‘weak’ attitudes in not being committed to truth: imagining, like considering, assuming, 
etc., is truth-neutral, not truth-committed. As explained in §1, imaginings, despite being 
similar to beliefs both functionally and with respect to inferential mechanisms, do not 
track truth simpliciter. Yet despite their affinity with the ‘weak’ attitudes, imaginings 
cannot have Moorean conjunctions as their content. Hence the crucial question is why, 
given that we are relatively free to choose what to imagine, we can’t imagine, under the 
said conditions, the conjunction ‘p and I believe that not-p.’ 
 
but I believe that I’m not.’ Yet without further qualification, imagining this conjunction 
under the said conditions is impossible: we cannot imagine, e.g., that we are not really 
eating a delicious red apple, while simultaneously imagining that we believe, from the 
first-person perspective, that we are eating that apple. In trying to imagine the second 
conjunct, it seems that we must set aside our imagining of the first conjunct, ‘detach’ 
ourselves from it, and adopt a different perspective from which it is the case that we are 
eating the apple. 
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To answer this question, we need to investigate why belief-like imaginings, despite 
being truth-neutral, cannot have Moorean conjunctions as their content. We must find a 
feature of belief-like imaginings that renders it impossible to imagine Moorean 
conjunctions. 
 
4. The Solution 
 
4.1 Walton’s Thesis 
 
It might be suggested that the feature of imaginings that explains the impossibility of 
imagining Moorean conjunctions follows from the fact that imaginings are committed, 
not to truth simpliciter, but rather to fictional truth. Consider the following passage from 
Walton: 
 
Fictionality has turned out to be analogous to truth in some ways; the relation 
between fictionality and imagining parallels that between truth and belief. Imagining 
aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true. What is true is to be believed; what is 
fictional is to be imagined. (1990, 41)16 
 
 
16 Note that Walton uses ‘fictionality’ and ‘fictional’ to refer to fictional truth. Note also 
that, as explained in §3, the set of propositions stipulated to be true in an imaginative 
project constitutes a ‘fictional world’; see Walton (1990, 66-67), and note 9 above. 
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Walton’s idea is that, when we engage in an imaginative project, our imaginings are 
‘directed’ at a fictional world, seeking to represent ‘facts’ of that world, that is, to have 
the stipulated fictional truths as their content. In reading a novel, for instance, we are 
mandated to imagine the propositions that are taken to be true in the novel’s world. In 
playing games of make-believe, we similarly seek to imagine that which is stipulated to 
be fictionally true. Recall Greg and Eric’s game of make-believe, in which they take tree-
stumps to be fictional bears (Walton 1990, 37ff). When Greg and Eric see something in 
the distance that they believe to be a stump, they immediately imagine, as per their 
game’s rule that real-world stumps are fictional bears, that there is a bear at that spot. If, 
upon approaching, they discover that what looked like a stump from afar is just a boulder, 
their imaginings are altered accordingly, to reflect the fictional truth: they imagine that 
there isn’t a bear at that spot. In this sense, much as beliefs track truth simpliciter, 
imaginings track fictional truth. 
The impossibility of imagining Moorean conjunctions can be explained, so it might 
be argued, by invoking the commitment to imagine that which is fictionally true in one’s 
imaginative project. Much as we cannot, in the truth-committed state of believing, accept 
the conjunction ‘it’s raining and I believe that it isn’t raining’ (under the said conditions), 
so we cannot accept that conjunction in the [fictional-truth]-committed state of imagining 
(under the said conditions). The idea is that whatever accounts for the impossibility of 
believing the Moorean conjunction also accounts for the impossibility of imagining it, 
since imaginings aim at the fictionally true just as beliefs aim at the true.17 When Greg, 
 
17 On the ‘doxastic logic’ approach (see note 11), formalizing the inconsistency that 
arises from Walton’s thesis requires revising certain axioms. Assuming that, like beliefs, 
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e.g., imagines that there is a bear at a certain spot, he cannot imagine, simultaneously, 
that he (first-person) believes that there isn’t a bear at that spot. In this case, the 
impossibility of such an imagining clearly parallels the impossibility of the belief that 
 
imagining propositions in a given imaginative project distributes over conjunction, IB(p 
& B(not-p)) entails IB(p) and IB(B(not-p)) (where ‘IB’ denotes belief-like imagining). 
However, applying an ‘imaginative’ version of 4c is problematic, since IB(B(not-p)) 
obviously does not entail B(not-p) (i.e., imagining a belief does not entail that the belief 
arises in the real world; moreover, even if it entailed this belief, we wouldn’t arrive at the 
required contradiction). One way to derive a contradiction from IB(p) and IB(B(not-P)) is 
to argue that, since the belief in question is imagined under the first-person mode of 
presentation, it is ‘transparent’ in the sense that IB(B(not-p)) entails IB(not-p). The idea is 
that if one imagines (first-person-) believing a proposition, one also imagines, due to the 
alleged transparency, that very proposition. We then get that IB(not-p) is inconsistent 
with IB(p), by an ‘imaginative’ version of axiom D. A different way to derive a 
contradiction is by accepting another thesis of Walton, i.e., that every imagining is de se 
(Walton 1990, §I.4), or specifically that imagining something involves “imagining 
(oneself) believing or knowing it” (1990, 214). On this thesis, the first conjunct, IB(p), 
entails IB(B(p)). And since B(p) and B(not-p) are inconsistent (i.e., as per the axiomatic 
analysis of Moore’s paradox, i.e., regarding belief), their conjunction cannot be imagined. 
Note, however, that since I proceed to reject Walton’s thesis, and argue that the 
impossibility in question ensues from a different kind of commitment, I will not develop 
or defend these ideas here. 
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purportedly guides Greg’s imagining, namely, Greg’s belief about a real-world stump. 
That is, much as Greg cannot believe, as per Moore’s puzzle, ‘there is a stump at a certain 
spot and I believe that there isn’t a stump there,’ he cannot imagine the corresponding 
conjunction in which ‘stump’ is replaced by ‘bear.’ In general, much as beliefs’ 
commitment to truth renders it impossible to believe the conjunction, so the commitment 
of belief-like imaginings to fictional truth renders it impossible to imagine the 
conjunction. And since assuming, considering, entertaining a thought, etc., are committed 
neither to truth nor to fictional truth, assuming, considering, etc. Moorean conjunctions 
does not pose a problem. 
This proposed solution, however, is flawed: the thesis that imaginings aim at 
fictional truth, that they seek to represent the propositions stipulated to be fictionally true, 
is incorrect. Walton (2015, ch. 2) himself acknowledges that his thesis, as initially 
proposed, raises various problems, adducing cases that, he maintains, demonstrate its 
deficiencies. In my view, the main problem is that we can imagine propositions we know 
to be fictional falsehoods without violating any alleged commitment to fictional truth. For 
were our imaginings committed to fictional truth as beliefs are committed to truth 
simpliciter, our epistemic practices vis-à-vis imagining would be like our epistemic 
practices vis-à-vis believing. But the former epistemic practices differ radically from the 
latter. Take the extent to which beliefs and imaginings are responsive to evidence. If we 
have evidence to the effect that a certain proposition is true, we are inclined to believe the 
proposition; absent evidence or beliefs to the contrary, we usually believe that which we 
have evidence for. Sometimes we do act irrationally, e.g., in self-deception. But we don’t 
really seek, systematically and consciously, to adopt false beliefs. 
24 
Imaginings, by contrast, are structured so as to allow us to take on erroneous 
perspectives, make discoveries, be surprised, etc., or more specifically: to imagine 
fictional falsehoods. No problem is raised, for instance, by reading a murder mystery a 
second time, and imagining, as per the work’s implicit guidance, the fictional falsehood 
that the butler is the murderer, while knowing full well that it is true in the mystery’s 
world that the UPS deliveryman is the murderer (Walton 2015, 24). Similarly, in playing 
the stumps-are-bears game, Greg might plan to imagine what it would be like to be 
surprised by a bear. Although Greg knows that there is a stump behind him, and therefore 
that it is fictionally true that there is a bear behind him, he can easily imagine, as per his 
plan, the fictional falsehood that there is no bear there. Greg’s intention to experience a 
surprise-like feeling, by first imagining that fictional falsehood, and then imagining the 
fictional truth that there is a bear there, can be fulfilled without violating any putative 
commitment to fictional truth. 
In short, in imagining, we can intentionally set aside our knowledge or beliefs about 
the fictional truth—just as we set aside our knowledge or belief that what we are 
imagining is false simpliciter. We do not resist imagining propositions we know to be 
fictional falsehoods, as we would were imaginings committed to fictional truth. 
Accepting that belief-like imaginings are not constrained by a commitment to fictional 
truth doesn’t mean that they aren’t constrained at all. As mentioned in §1, there are limits 
to what can be imagined; in this respect, imagining is not like assuming, considering, 
speculating, etc. To account for the impossibility of imagining Moorean conjunctions 
(under the said conditions), a specific sort of constraint on imagining must be introduced. 
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4.2 Walton’s Thesis Revisited 
 
The first-pass solution can be revised. I suggest that, although imaginings are not 
committed to fictional truth as beliefs are committed to truth simpliciter, there is a sense 
in which they ‘mimic’ beliefs in this respect. Like the first-pass account, this suggestion 
accords with simulationist views of imagination (see, e.g., Kind 2013, §2; Balcerak 
Jackson 2016, §3); however, to solve the paradox, it analyzes the pertinent similarity 
between imagining and belief differently than the first-pass (Waltonian) solution. I 
contend that when we imagine, our real-world state of imagining is ipso facto taken to be 
a fictional state of (first-person) believing. For example, imagining that it’s raining entails 
that one plays the fictional role of (first-person) believing that it’s raining. There is, 
indeed, no real-world commitment to imagining that which is fictionally true. The actual, 
real-world commitment that applies to imagining is different: it is a commitment to a 
principle constitutive of imagining, the principle that imaginings ipso facto function, with 
respect to the imagined propositions, as fictional (first-person) beliefs.18 
 
18 As mentioned in §1 and note 7 above, on certain accounts of imagining, to say that it is 
constitutive of belief-like imaginings that they are posited to be fictional first-person 
beliefs might be too strong. For on some accounts of imagining, imaginings are belief-
like only in circumscribed respects, in specific contexts, or under specific constraints. To 
align with these views, my claim should be modified as follows: in the specific cases 
where imaginings are subject to the puzzle, they are subject to the puzzle because they 
function, or are constrained so as to function, as fictional first-person beliefs. 
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This commitment is sufficiently flexible to enable imaginers to play not only the 
fictional role of believing truths, but also the fictional role of believing falsehoods. 
Specifically, we are free to disregard our (real-world) knowledge about the fictional 
world, and deliberately step into the fictional role of believing falsehoods; i.e., we are 
free to intentionally imagine fictional falsehoods. Since believing falsehoods is 
commonplace even for rational subjects, playing the fictional role of believing falsehoods 
does not pose a problem, hence imagining fictional falsehoods, or intending to do so, 
poses no problem. However, since we cannot believe Moorean conjunctions, we cannot 
take on the fictional role of believing Moorean conjunctions. This role is, indeed, 
impossible to fill, hence imagining Moorean conjunctions is impossible (under the said 
four conditions). 
This calls for clarification. We obviously don’t, or don’t necessarily, imagine 
ourselves believing every proposition we imagine. In what sense, then, is it the case that 
imaginings are taken to be fictional (first-person) beliefs? To answer this question, a 
certain structural aspect of imaginative projects must be examined. As mentioned in §3, 
in addition to imaginings (as well as conative states, emotional responses, etc.), 
imaginative projects also comprise stipulations of fictional truths. There are many ways 
in which fictional truths can be set down: we can stipulate that a proposition is fictionally 
true by intending to imagine a fictional truth, or by devising rules or instructions to the 
effect that certain propositions are fictionally true; we can implicitly or explicitly take 
real-world objects or properties to be part of the fictional world, and thus (implicitly) set 
down that some of the propositions that are true simpliciter of those objects or properties 
are also true of those objects or properties in the fictional world; etc. Another salient way 
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in which fictional truths are set down is by rules that take a real-world object (or a 
property, or an event) to be a different object (property; event) in the fictional world. 
Greg and Eric, e.g., take tree-stumps to be fictional bears; similarly, a child might take a 
banana to be a fictional telephone, a wooden stick to be a fictional horse, or herself to be 
a hunter. Walton calls these real-world objects “props,” and defines them as “generators 
of fictional truths” (Walton 1990, 37ff). 
As Walton emphasizes, fictional truths are not always coextensive with propositions 
imagined by the imaginer: we don’t necessarily imagine every proposition that is 
determined to be fictionally true; and we may, deliberately or not, imagine fictional 
falsehoods. Greg and Eric, e.g., might overlook a stump, or intentionally ignore it, in 
which case they would not imagine the fictional truth determined by the rule they 
devised, namely, that there’s a bear at that spot. Moreover, they can imagine the fictional 
falsehood that there isn’t a bear there. Fictional truths, in short, must not be identified 
with imagined propositions. 
Indeed, the mental act or state of positing that a real-world object (property; event) is 
a different fictional object (property; event) should not be identified with imagining: 
prop-related stipulations (like stipulations of fictional truths in general) are one thing, 
imagining propositions is something else. Given that prop-related stipulations are 
irreducible to other mental acts or states, it would seem that they are a distinct element of 
imaginative projects. Of course, stipulations are generally made in a wide variety of 
contexts, not only in the context of imagining. But stipulations of fictional truths, 
specifically those that are made by props, have a specific function in imaginative 
projects: they regulate, or constrain, the manner in which the imaginer engages in a 
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specific project, how the project evolves, etc., as Greg and Eric’s game demonstrates. In 
this paper, I will not discuss this issue in detail. For the purposes of my argument here, all 
that needs to be accepted is that in an imaginative project, prop-related stipulations 
involve principles or rules. More specifically, in an imaginative project involving props, 
imaginers must follow the general rule that whatever the props stand for exists in the 
project’s fictional world. 
The insight that a fictional world is established by, among other things, prop-related 
stipulations is crucial for solving the puzzle in question. For just as real-world objects, 
properties and events can be taken to be different objects, properties and events in the 
fictional world, in particular, certain real-world mental states can be taken to be different 
mental states in the fictional world. One example is mental images, which are sometimes, 
if not always, taken to be fictional perceptual experiences.19 In imagining, e.g., that the 
 
19 This claim applies only to mental images that arise in the course of imagining, and not 
to those that arise in other contexts, e.g., in recollection. However, even in the context of 
imagining, some would dispute this claim. Arcangeli (2019b), e.g., argues that mental 
images are not a distinct kind of attitude, but rather a type of (sensory) content that is 
common to different attitudes (remembering, belief, desire, imagining). Hence it appears 
that, on Arcangeli’s view, mental images (qua mental content) cannot serve as props. 
However, even on Arcangeli’s view, real-world visual experiences (and, similarly, 
actions, desires, intentions) can serve as props. E.g., it is fictionally true of Greg and 
Eric’s visual experience of a tree stump that it is a visual experience of a bear. In this 
vein, my claim is that imaginings themselves ipso facto serve as props: they are posited to 
be fictional first-person beliefs. 
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sun is going down, we may conjure up a mental visual image of a sunset, and take this 
real-world mental image to be a fictional visual experience of a sunset. This fact may be 
reflected in our reports about our project. Being asked to describe our imaginative 
project, we may specify various fictional truths that follow from this ‘swap,’ e.g., that we 
observe the sun from a certain vantage point, that the sun has the specific visual 
properties represented by the (real-world) visual image, etc. Such reports follow from the 
fact that our mental images serve as props, and thus generate those fictional truths. 
A similar ‘swap’ can be made vis-à-vis perceptual experiences. When Greg and Eric 
visually experience a tree-stump, they take their real-world visual experience of the 
stump to be a fictional visual experience of a bear. This ‘swap’ determines various 
fictional truths (e.g., that a bear is seen by Eric, that it is not seen by Greg, that it is 
observed by Eric from a certain perspective, etc.), which may be reflected also in the 
discourse between Greg and Eric. Greg may ask Eric whether he ‘sees a bear’ in the 
bushes; Eric may respond that he does indeed ‘see a bear’ there (i.e., as per his real-world 
visual experience of a tree-stump). Furthermore, Greg’s and Eric’s utterances are also 
stipulated to be different fictional utterances. Greg’s real-world utterance is taken to be a 
fictional question about a bear, and Eric’s utterance is taken to be a fictional assertion 
about a bear. Likewise, Greg’s and Eric’s real-world intentions or desires that generate 
those utterances (as well as other actions) are taken to be different fictional intentions or 
desires; e.g., Greg fictionally intends / desires, by virtue of his real-world intention / 
desire to convey that sentence, to learn whether there is a bear behind the bushes. 
In general, many of Greg’s and Eric’s real-world actions, perceptual experiences, 
desires, intentions, and other mental states serve as props, i.e., as generators of fictional 
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truths: they are stipulated to be various fictional mental states associated with bear-
hunting, thus rendering certain propositions fictionally true. Again, the imaginers need 
not imagine each proposition that follows from such ‘swaps.’ The fictional truths about 
their visual experiences, intentions, etc., are generated by such stipulations, and are not 
always represented in their evolving imaginings. Note that in addition to such particular 
cases where real-world mental states serve as props, there are also systematic accounts 
that invoke ‘swaps’ between mental states. Consider, e.g., Walton’s account of pictorial 
experience, namely the experience we normally have in looking at a picture. On this 
account, pictorial experience (often called ‘seeing-in’) is partly-imaginative: in looking at 
a picture of, e.g., a horse, the picture’s viewer takes her real-world visual experience of 
the picture’s marked surface to be the fictional experience of seeing a horse (Walton 
1990, ch. 8; cf. Chasid 2016). A similar kind of ‘swap’ is invoked by Walton in his 
account of emotional responses to fiction. Walton argues that ‘fear,’ ‘pity,’ ‘hate,’ and 
other emotional states that arise in response to imagining are not ordinary fear, pity, and 
hate. Rather, they are quasi-emotions (quasi-fear, quasi-pity, quasi-hate). In addition to 
their being real-world states generated by imaginings, these quasi-emotions are taken by 
the imaginer to be fictional emotions: the imaginer’s real-world quasi-fear, quasi-pity, 
and quasi-hate are taken to be fictional fear, fictional pity, and fictional hate, respectively. 
For instance, when Charles responds to his imagining that he is chased by a monster by 
experiencing quasi-fear (which is, again, not fear), this real-world state of quasi-fear 
serves as a prop: taken to be a fictional fear, it generates the fictional truth that Charles is 
afraid of the monster (Walton 1990, §7.1 and §7,2; 2015, ch. 14). 
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Following this line of thought, I contend that it is constitutive of imaginative projects 
that our (real-world) states of belief-like imagining are taken, probably implicitly and 
without much awareness, to be fictional first-person beliefs: in imagining a proposition, 
we ipso facto take ourselves to (first-person) believe that proposition in the fictional 
world. This constraint on imagining commits us to playing the role of fictional believers, 
i.e., believers of fictional truths or fictional falsehoods; it doesn’t commit us to imagining 
only fictional truths (as Walton’s thesis implies). Specifically, we can intentionally 
imagine fictional falsehoods: we can structure our imaginative project in such a way that 
we imagine propositions from the perspective of a believer who is ignorant of certain 
evidence, is misled into believing falsehoods, etc., as happens in rereading a murder 
mystery, in Greg’s plan to imagine being surprised by a bear, and in similar cases. 
There are, however, propositions that, much as they cannot be (first-person) 
believed, cannot be taken to be (first-person) believed in the fictional world, and hence 
cannot be imagined. Whatever the reason a subject cannot (first-person) believe the 
conjunction ‘it’s raining and I believe that it isn’t raining,’ she likewise cannot play the 
role of (first-person) believing that conjunction.20 In other words, the impossibility in 
 
20 On the said formalistic approach, this should be analyzed in terms of a commitment to 
follow the principle that imaginings are posited to be fictional (first-person) beliefs. This 
idea can be expressed by assuming that an ‘ideal’ imaginer must also imagine the 
fictionally-true proposition that follows from this principle, namely, she must imagine 
B(p & B(not-p)). However, since B(p & B(not-p)) is contradictory (according to the 
standard analysis of Moore’s paradox in terms of doxastic logic; see note 11), it cannot be 
imagined (as per the impossibility of imagining a contradiction). 
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question is the impossibility of following a constitutive rule, namely, the rule that ensues 
from the fact that belief-like imaginings serve as props. In imagining, we can take on the 
role of false believers, but qua rational subjects, taking on the role of believers vis-à-vis 
Moorean conjunctions is impossible. Hence we cannot imagine Moorean conjunctions. 
Note that following the rule according to which one’s real-world state of imagining 
is taken to be a fictional state of believing does not presuppose any specific description of 
a fictional believer; that is, without additional stipulations, the fictional (first-person) 
believer has no determinate identity. Indeed, the fictional believer’s indeterminacy 
reflects the descriptively-lean manner in which beliefs are ascribed from the first-person 
perspective.21 We may not be aware that, in imagining, we play the role of first-person 
believers, and it is obviously not necessary that we imagine ourselves believing anything. 
Yet playing this role is integral to belief-like imagining, and is reflected in the manner in 
which our imaginings unfold (see note 18). 
Since it is constitutive of belief-like imaginings that they are posited to be fictional 
(first-person) beliefs, we cannot imagine Moorean conjunctions. We can entertain 
Moorean conjunctions in thought, consider them, etc., since these attitudes are not bound 
by a constraint such as that which applies in the case of imaginings, i.e., they are not 
stipulated, in the sense specified above, to be fictional beliefs. The impossibility of 
imagining Moorean conjunctions also differs from the impossibility of believing Moorean 
conjunctions, for unlike beliefs, imaginings are not committed to truth (nor are they 
committed to fictional truth, as Walton asserted). Rather, the impossibility of imagining 
Moorean conjunctions is the impossibility of following a principle constitutive of 
 
21 On the first-person perspective in the context of imagining, see Nichols (2008). 
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imagining, namely, that the imaginer plays the role of fictional (first-person) believer vis-
à-vis fictional truths.22 
As I noted above, my proposed explanation of the impossibility of imagining ‘p and I 
believe that not-p’ accords with simulationist accounts of imagination: it invokes a 
feature that explains how imaginings ‘simulate’ beliefs specifically with respect to having 
Moorean conjunctions as their contents. Indeed, since Walton’s thesis that imagining 
aims at the fictional truth as belief aims at truth (which can also be deemed a 
simulationist thesis) is problematic, ascribing the proposed feature to imagining shows 
that the impossibility of imagining Moorean conjunctions is not anomalous. Despite the 
 
22 In this paper, I defend the claim that imaginings are ipso facto posited to be first-person 
beliefs by arguing that it provides a cogent and plausible explanation of the impossibility 
in question. I have presented other arguments for this claim elsewhere (see Chasid 2020; 
forthcoming). Let me sketch the contours of one such argument here. Consider the 
following example. In reading a work of fiction and imagining that A is the villain (as the 
work’s first chapters implicitly direct us to do), and then shifting to imagine that B, not 
A, is the villain (as per the final chapter’s guidance), we ascribe a sense of ‘error’ to our 
first imagining, we feel a surprise-like or discovery-like feeling, etc. Such reactions arise 
even if we read the work a second time, i.e., while knowing the pertinent fictional truths. 
I argue that these reactions—i.e., ascribing ‘error,’ feeling ‘surprised,’ etc.—show that 
we posit a fictional doxastic point of view vis-à-vis the propositions we imagine. More 
generally, our responses to imagining demonstrate that, when we imagine, we posit 
ourselves to be fictional believers vis-à-vis what we imagine, although we do not 
necessarily imagine ourselves believing anything. 
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complexity it ascribes to imagining, my account does not rest on any element of 
imaginative projects that has not been acknowledged in the literature. Although props and 
their logic (qua generators of fictional truths) have been examined chiefly by Walton 
(1990), to my knowledge, no one has denied that prop-related stipulations—e.g., in 
taking a banana to be a fictional telephone, a stick to be a fictional sword, or oneself to be 
a fictional hunter—play an important role in imaginative projects. The way in which 
props function specifically when they are mental states might explain other phenomena 
associated with imagination, as the aforementioned examples seem to indicate. This issue 




I started by showing that, under certain conditions, it is impossible to imagine (in the 
belief-like sense of ‘imagining’) the proposition ‘p and I believe that not-p.’ I then 
adduced a puzzle: since belief-like imagining—like assuming, entertaining in thought, 
etc.—is not committed to truth, why is it that we nonetheless cannot imagine Moorean 
conjunctions, whereas we can assume, entertain in thought, and consider them? Despite 
the unequivocal difference between imagining and believing vis-à-vis truth-commitment, 
with respect to Moorean conjunctions, imagining seems to be like believing, and not like 
the mental attitudes of assuming, entertaining in thought, speculating, etc. 
To solve the puzzle, I first adduced Walton’s thesis that imaginings parallel beliefs in 
‘aiming’ at the truths pertinent to them: imaginings are committed to fictional truth just as 
beliefs are committed to truth simpliciter. Showing that Walton’s thesis is problematic, I 
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proposed, instead, that imaginings mimic beliefs in that they are posited to be fictional 
(first-person) beliefs. In imagining a proposition, we ipso facto take ourselves to play the 
role of (first-person) believing that proposition in the fictional world. Hence since it is 
impossible to believe Moorean conjunctions, it is also impossible to imagine such 
conjunctions, that is, to play the role of believing such conjunctions. 
To explain the sense in which, in imagining, we posit ourselves to be fictional 
believers, I invoked Walton’s notion of props. I argued that much as we stipulate that 
real-world objects or properties are different objects or properties in the fictional world, 
we can also stipulate that real-world mental states are different mental states in the 
fictional world. This is the sense in which the real-world state of imagining is ipso facto 
stipulated to be a fictional state of (first-person) believing. 
I concluded that the impossibility of imagining Moorean conjunctions does not ensue 
from the alleged commitment to imagining the fictional truth—a commitment expressed 
in Walton’s thesis (1990, 41) that “imagining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the 
truth.” Rather, it is the impossibility of acting in accordance with a principle constitutive 
of belief-like imagining, namely, the principle that our perspective vis-à-vis the content 
of our imaginings is the fictional first-person perspective of a believer. 
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